

LOCAL ACTOR STRATEGIES IN AGRARIAN CONFLICT RESOLUTION: A CASE STUDY OF LAND OWNERSHIP DISPUTES IN NORTH SUMATRA

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ABSTRACT

This research analyzes agrarian conflicts between local communities and oil palm plantation companies in North Sumatra Province, focusing on local actors' strategies in defending land ownership rights. Using a qualitative approach, data was collected through observation, focus group discussions (FGDs), in-depth interviews, and document analysis. This research draws on Bourdieu's Social Practice Theory to understand how local actors utilize social, cultural, economic, and symbolic capital in conflict resolution efforts. The results show that local actors developed various strategies, including community organizing, legal advocacy, and collaboration with civil society institutions, to defend their land from forced acquisition by state plantation companies. These agrarian conflicts reflect the local government's lack of institutionalized conflict resolution, leaving communities to rely more on their initiatives. This research provides insights into the dynamics of agrarian conflicts and the importance of strengthening the role of local actors in creating sustainable conflict resolution. The findings are relevant for government agencies, civil society organizations, and academics in designing conflict resolution strategies and more equitable agrarian policies.

Keywords: Agrarian Conflict, Bourdieu's Social Practice Theory, Conflict Resolution, Local Actors, North Sumatra.

INTRODUCTION

The massive (Afrizal, 2013) (FPP et al., 2013) (KPA, 2019) (Berenschot et al., 2022) expansion of oil palm plantations in Indonesia-occurring from the early 1980s- is one of the most essential land-use conversion forces in the modern history of rural communities (Cramb & Curry, 2012) that has had a significant impact on rural communities (Afrizal & Berenschot, 2022; Berenschot et al., 2022) due to its transformative power, (Li & Semedi, 2021). The rate of land conversion it produces is speedy. In Indonesia, the area of oil palm plantations has almost doubled over the last decade (Austin et al., 2017) and has changed the land function of almost 15,000,000 hectares (Statistik, 2023). In addition to contributing to the economy and causing environmental damage (Douglas et al., 2009), this expansion has also caused massive escalation conflicts between palm oil companies and rural communities

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(Colchester et al., 2006; Parinduri et al., 2024). Referring to (Afrizal, 2015b) the oil palm plantation conflict is a conflict of interest between affected communities and oil palm plantation companies related to land acquisition (including land release agreements) by oil palm plantation companies. To be studied, the conflict under consideration has developed into open action. This research focuses on the institution of local government conflict resolution forums; specifically, attention is paid to the performance, organization, and procedures of government conflict resolution forums to resolve agrarian conflicts. A conflict resolution forum is defined as a mechanism or forum available to resolve conflicts or parties who resolve conflicts (Benda-Beckmann, 1981) (Ramsbotham et al., 2016). Research on the causes of conflicts over land use change by oil palm expansion has been widely conducted (Colchester et al., 2006; de Jong et al., 2017; Mutolib et al., 2020; Nilakrisna et al., 2016; Wahab et al., 2018). However, little research on its resolution has been done. Research on conflict resolution and solutions for oil palm expansion land is limited to third parties as mediators (Dhiaulhaq et al., 2014, 2018) (Afrizal, 2013). The ability of community residents to use conflict resolution forums found that local governments are often positioned/expected by villagers as managers of agrarian conflict resolution forums – local government officials have done so (Afrizal, 2005) (Afrizal & Berenschot, 2022). Despite this, comprehensive research on these forums has never been conducted: (Benda-Beckmann, 1981) examines customary forums and courts; (Dhiaulhaq et al., 2014) examined NGO forums; (Afrizal & Berenschot, 2022) examined RSPO international multistakeholder forums. Therefore, research on the institutional performance of government conflict resolution forums is needed. The conflict resolution forum is named integrated resolution team, team 9, and others (Berenschot et al., 2023). According to Local Government Law No. 23 of 2014, conflict handling is included in general government affairs by provincial and district/city governments. This is where this research contributes. The results of the research are helpful for civil society organizations to plan strategies for mentoring community members to resolve conflicts with palm oil companies and as advocacy material to increase citizens' access to justice. The results of this study are also helpful for academics and government institutions as a basis for formulating ways to improve the performance of local governments in conflict resolution in general in a decentralized system.

This study aims to explore the general pattern of agrarian conflict resolution results carried out by local governments, explore local government institutions to resolve agrarian conflicts, and explore local government forum procedures for resolving agrarian conflicts. Sumatra Island is suitable as a research location because oil palm plantation conflicts have occurred since the beginning of large-scale oil palm expansion in the early 1980s (Afrizal, 2005, 2015b; Afrizal & Berenschot, 2022; KPA, 2019). In addition, several escalating oil palm plantation conflicts that occurred at the beginning of the reform on this island continued until 20 years after the reform (Afrizal & Berenschot, 2022; Rokhim et al., 2020), indicating a conflict resolution problem. So, an assessment is needed to answer the general pattern of agrarian conflict resolution results carried out by the Government, the institutional structure of local governments in resolving agrarian conflicts, and government forum procedures in resolving agrarian conflicts.

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METHODS

This research was carried out by examining the object in the form of a local government agrarian conflict resolution forum in North Sumatra Province. This location was chosen because of the dominance of legal and semi-legal rights to land. For this, we will collect detailed data using indepth interview techniques on the form of the organization, its legality, its composition, its funding, and the division of labor. We will collect documents: forum certificates, correspondence, and SOPs (Standard Operating Procedures) to determine the form and composition of the forum. We will also interview administrators and forum members in-depth, especially to learn about funding and labor division. For this, we will find out by examining some of the cases handled by the forum: we will explore the division of labor or the relationship between forum personnel in handling cases. For the form of forum and legality, we will also interview district law bureau personnel and constitutional law experts. Second, researchers will review government regulations that encourage the forum's form, funding, and performance. To find relevant laws and regulations, we will interview several experts in constitutional law at the University of North Sumatra and the district government's legal bureau staff. Research focuses not only on procedures on paper but, more deeply, on procedures carried out. First, we will find out the planned procedure. This examines the SOPs for handling conflicts made by the forum. Then, we will explore the actual procedure by examining cases successfully reported by villagers to the local government. We will explore how the report was received and processed to produce results. For this purpose, we will use the case study technique with in-depth interviews with administrators and forum members involved in the process. We document the process and explore the ideas behind the forum's actions.

RESULTS AND DISCUSSION

Location and Conflict History

Persil IV refers to an area claimed by PTPN II, located in Tanjung Morawa District, Deli Serdang Regency. This area is about 30 kilometers from Medan City. The term "Persil IV" comes from a government policy in 1953 that granted land management permits in the form of Persil, covering an area of 525 hectares, to communities in five hamlets. The five hamlets are Tungkusian Hamlet (administrative part of Tadukan Raga Village), Sinembah and Limau Mungkur Hamlets (administrative part of Limau Mungkur Village), and Lau Barus and Batutak Hamlets (administrative part of Lau Barus Baru Village). These three villages are administratively included in STM Hilir District, Deli Serdang Regency. The policy of granting a cultivation permit is outlined by issuing a cultivation permit, and each family head gets 2 (two) hectares of arable land and a residential area of 1,000 m² (one thousand square meters). Since 1953, Persil IV has owned about 260 households, and the owners have paid taxes on the land every year. Although they only obtained cultivation permits in 1953, most residents of these five hamlets have managed the land and erected temporary buildings, such as huts, as shelters during the growing season since the 1940s. The community has planted various crops on the land, such as food crops and perennials (Lubis & Sari, 2024).

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In 1972, when it was almost time for the rice harvest, the landowners received news from PTPN II that the land farmers on Persil land had managed should be handed over to the plantations. The plantation promises that land and crops owned by residents will be compensated. The plantation also urged farmers to immediately submit Persil land cultivation permits to them within one month after the compensation announcement was issued. Receiving this news, a farmer and religious leader from Tungkusen Hamlet named Haji Sulaiman gathered all residents who had permits to cultivate Persil land to conduct deliberations at his home. This meeting was attended by all landowners who had tilling permits. Most of them agreed not to submit a cultivation permit to the plantation. This decision was taken because the amount of compensation offered by the plantation was considered inadequate, and it was more important for residents to maintain the management of their land as agricultural land. Farmers and other residents showed firmness in defending their rights to Persil land and the decision to keep the land as agricultural land. Community rejection led the plantations to carry out propaganda and accusations against farmers related to communism, with support from the police, army, and government officials of the STM Hilir sub-district. In this situation, farmers respond by accelerating the harvesting process of their growing crops. In addition, they began to take turns guarding and supervising the land they owned by staying there for days. This is done to protect their land from plantation attempts and authorities that threaten their ownership rights.

The state plantation mobilized all plantation workers with the support of police and soldiers, and they headed to land owned by farmers. They carry tractors and other heavy equipment. Unexpectedly, on that night, all the huts owned by farmers were burned, and the crops on them were destroyed. This incident continued until the next day with the use of tractors supervised by dozens of state security forces. Two months after the destruction, the state plantations began planting rubber plants on 320 hectares of Persil IV land, while the remaining 200 hectares were planted with oil palms. As a result of the 1972 incident, farmers' access to manage the land they had legally owned since 1953 was cut off. This incident reflects a crackdown by plantations and security forces that has resulted in huge losses to farmers in terms of land and crops they have cultivated over the years. Since the land-grabbing incident 1972, relations between farmers and PTPN II have become tense and disharmonious. In 1975, there was a case of land grabbing owned by the community in Tadukan Raga Village. The role of the village head and sub-district head of STM Hilir did not produce results in helping this problem. Farmers who owned land in Persil IV in four other hamlets also realized that formal channels involving the expectation of legal certainty in government institutions would not provide justice for them. This illustrates the receding trust in formal processes and the inequality in the treatment of farming communities regarding land ownership and management. The impact of land grabbing not only robbed farmers of their relationship with their cultivation roots but also resulted in an increase in poverty rates in the Deli Serdang Regency area. This situation illustrates the adverse socioeconomic effects of land grabbing on farming communities and society. Many farmers have had to seek alternative livelihoods because they have lost access to their farmland. This has led to an increase in wage laborers and informal sector jobs, which can contribute to

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increased poverty rates in the region. In 1970 as many as 260 Persil landowning families lost their right of access to the main means of production, namely land. Haji Sulaiman and several other residents were forced to survive by relying on reserve land. This land was not originally intended to grow staple food crops, but the situation forced them to convert it completely into an agricultural area for staple food crops. After going through a long journey with economic conditions that are increasingly insufficient for family needs, farmers are still trying to find alternatives to overcome the difficulties faced. At the same time, they are also beginning to realize that the number of surviving landowners is decreasing. Farmers reflect on this reality and assume that if the first generation of Persil landowners does not take action to reclaim their land from plantations, then land ownership status will be even more unclear in the future. Although they realize that their efforts may not return the land that has been confiscated in the past, the farmers still believe that by starting minimal action, they have left behind a history of struggle that the next generation will pass on. This reflects the perseverance and determination of the peasants to not only fight for their rights but also pass on the spirit of struggle to future generations.

On August 8, 1996, citizens, spearheaded by several figures, sent a letter to the Vice President of the Republic of Indonesia through the 5,000 Post Drum Line. The 5,000 Post Drum is a mailbox of complaints addressed to the central government, including the President and Vice President. The complaint letter from the farmer received a response on behalf of the Assistant Vice President, directing the farmer to report the matter to the Regent of Deli Serdang. Farmers sent a follow-up complaint letter to the Regent of Deli Serdang in the follow-up. On February 21, 1997, the Regent of Deli Serdang responded by issuing an answer letter number 593/15/RHS. The contents of the letter, among other things, suggested that farmers resolve the Persil land case through legal channels. This situation creates new hope regarding solving the problem of land grabbing experienced by farmers. The response from the Regent guides farmers on legal steps that can be taken to address the issue. This shows that there are concrete steps that farmers can take in their efforts to get justice for their land grabbing. The meeting was then held with Commission A of the DPRD Deli Serdang with the conclusion that Persil IV land covering an area of 525 hectares was not included in the Right to Use (HGU) of PTPN II Kebun Limau Mungkur by regulations issued by the Minister of Home Affairs. The meeting results further concluded that the 2322 hectares of land controlled by PTPN II Kebun Limau Mungkur 922 hectares of remaining land do not have an HGU certificate. In this land, 525 hectares of Persil IV farmer land was seized by PTPN II in 1972. The remaining 397 hectares of land (922 - 525) are also believed to belong to Persil V farmers, also seized in 1972. This confirms farmers' ownership of land seized by plantations. The village heads of Tadukan Raga, Limau Mungkur, and Lau Barus stated that 922 hectares of land belonged to Persil IV and V farmers seized by PTPN II Kebun Limau Mungkur in 1972. Furthermore, the village heads suggested that the disputed land be immediately returned to the community based on evidence of ownership.

On March 24, 1999, the National Land Agency (BPN) level II Deli Serdang issued a decree with Number 410,874/P3/1999, which expressly explained that the Persil IV land requested by farmers was not included in the Right to Use (HGU) of PTPN II Kebun Limau

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Mungkur. After the decision from BPN was announced, the farmers submitted a letter of application to the sub-district head of STM Hilir to continue the process by requesting that a certificate from the sub-district head be issued. This step aims to strengthen the legitimacy of the ownership of the land in question. The decisions of state institutions have been considered in favor of the peasants. However, PTPN II Limau Mungkur plantation did not let go of the decision to hand over the parcel of land to farmers. In 1999, farmers filed a lawsuit against PTPN II Kebun Limau Mungkur to the Lubuk Pakam District Court. The decision of Lubuk Pakam District Court Number 61/Pdt.G/1999 decided to grant the farmers' demands. PTPN II is required to pay material compensation of IDR 74 billion and return 922 hectares of land to farmers. This ruling gave farmers a major boost in retaining their land holdings with more confidence. This court decision resulted in a complete cessation of PTPN II's plantation production activities. Security levels in the administrative area of Kebun Limau Mungkur were also disrupted, and oil palm harvesting activities by PTPN II came to a halt after the Lubuk Pakam District Court ruling granted the farmers' demands. In the end, PTPN II was required to pay farmers material compensation of 49 billion rupiah. Farmers celebrated this victory by fencing the entire area of PTPN II's Limau Mungkur Plantation, especially Persil IV and V. This fencing action aims to stop PTPN II's plantation production activities completely. Resistance was widespread and open, with fences and signs reading "this land belongs to the people" carried out simultaneously. After two defeats in the judiciary, PTPN II in 2001 used a third party, paid thugs, to intimidate farmers occupying land. The intimidation continued with the clearing of all crops planted by farmers on 320 hectares of land, which eventually led to clashes. This clash resulted in a Persil IV farmer named Rajali being injured by a sharp weapon.

From 1986 to 2004, Persil IV landowners continued to fight legally and non-legally through resistance but still became uncertain about their rights. The peasants defined the era of political transition that occurred during the reform period as a period of openness that brought opportunities and opportunities to fight against the seizure of their land. Court rulings are considered an external resource that can be used to strengthen resistance more openly. The mobility of these external forces will constantly change according to the political direction in favor of the actors, in this case, the peasants, or vice versa. Conflict and resistance will intensify if the pressures of daily life exceed the tolerance limits of farmers. However, farmers may adopt a different resistance strategy if the situation worsens and external support weakens. Although farmers achieved victory in a formal legal context (legally), this result did not always match their expectations, so they referred to the victory with the expression of only getting it on a piece of paper. Until 2004, the fight with PTPN II legally ended with a PK granted by the Supreme Court. However, the landowners did not give up; instead, they increased their strength by inviting other residents around the village who did not have land to get involved in the struggle. They were promised 5-10 chains of land if they participated in the struggle for their land. With the increase in farmer group members, PTPN II and Parties hired by PTPN II maintain distance and stay quiet temporarily. Farmers use this state of silence to control their land, inherited by farmers who get a share of their involvement in reclaiming the land. Farmers silently carry out illegal

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activities, such as planting sweet potatoes around oil palm plants, which can interfere with oil palm growth. In addition, they do not infrequently poison oil palm plants, so they slowly die. Or deliberately tractor land around oil palm, which can interfere with oil palm growth. Even if there is a palm that bears fruit, they secretly harvest it and sell it. The money earned is then collected into a group struggle fund. Farmers recognized this period as a time when solidarity, common fate, and a feeling of facing a common enemy strengthened and became their fighting force to continue trying in their respective fields to grow sweet potatoes. With the increasing area of yam planting land and improving income, it became an attraction for other landowners still outside the village to return to manage their land. Based on the recognition of farmers, by being given the freedom to manage their land, economic life improves and even increases to be much more prosperous. The economy of residents grew and developed, and even new jobs began to open, one of which was the emergence of yam flour processing factories.

The Period of Recovery of Farmer's Economic Life

2010 became a historic year for Persil IV landowners because the approximately 525 hectares of land claimed by PTPN II had been cleared of oil palm plants owned by PTPN II. The land has become a yam field, precisely the type of cassava – they call it Malaysian yam. Growing sweet potatoes was originally because it was easier to care for than other young plants such as chili peppers, that must be monitored daily. For planting in the field to run smoothly, land clearing must be carried out, both from various grasses, all kinds of weeds, and various types of nuisance roots. This is done to facilitate the rooting of cassava and will eradicate various pests that will harm the host plant. It would help to use high-yielding, healthy seedlings, not overgrown with new shoots and are straight for optimal results. After planting sweet potatoes, weeding is done again before finally being given fertilizer. Based on the process that has been described, each stage is carried out by different workers, ranging from workers who are in charge of clearing land, planting seedlings, applying fertilizer, poisoning, to harvesting. Usually, they use a wholesale system, where several workers form a group who will then be paid per day by the landowner after working all day on the land. Therefore, it can be concluded that employment opportunities are wide open with the agricultural activities carried out by the Persil IV community. Apart from using land, the people of Dusun I Tungkusan also raise livestock, such as chickens, goats, and cows. These farm animals can also later be sold by them after reaching the appropriate age. It is not uncommon for local people to compete for their livestock, which will later be auctioned to be bought by others according to the price agreement with the owner. Persil IV land, which the local community has now managed, is still experiencing a cold war in the form of civil trials in court. The people of Dusun I Tungkusan's main demand is only land of 525 hectares, which has been their right since many years ago, but was taken over by PTPN II without any proper compensation or rent. Even with the freedom of the community to manage this Persil IV land, the wheel of life turns smoothly. The benefits obtained are not only by land owners because many parties, such as field workers, are involved in the process. Each stage consists of different people, sickles, along-along builders, and even traders. In another sense, this

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land management can employ many people and, of course, help overcome the problem of unemployment and poverty in the Tadukan Raga area, STM Hilir District.

The improving economic life and reduced interference from PTPN II and Parties hired by PTPN II brought the thought to Persil IV administrators to find ways to legitimize land ownership through property rights certificates. Moreover, they already have a strong foundation for the ownership of the land, for example, when there is a case of accusing residents who cultivate Persil IV land of theft and destruction. Then, the Deli Serdang Police asked the Deli Serdang Land Office to take measurements. Measurements made by the Deli Serdang Land Office in 2017 showed that after plotting on the registration map no. 47 of 1997 showed that the land parcel was located outside HGU no. 94 of 2003. Previously, in 2013, PTPN II Manager Afdeling Limau Mungkur issued a letter stating that the 922 Ha area was an area outside HGU PTPN II Kebun Limau Mungkur No. 94 of 2003 and based on the Decree of the Minister of Home Affairs SK.13 / HGU / DA / 75. Here, the landowners have begun to realize, slowly. However, surely PTPN II has admitted that 922 hectares of land, including 525 hectares belonging to Persil IV, do not belong to them because it is not included in the HGU, HGU in 1974 and extended to HGU in 2003. Here, the Persil IV landowner group and farmers smelled the involvement of other groups outside PTPN II. These individuals or groups take advantage of the situation where the HGU letter will expire in 2028, and they are preparing to extend the HGU. The extension was used to take the opportunity to take the land of Persil IV into the possession of the unscrupulous. Through a lawyer under the auspices of Hasrul Benny Harahap and Partners Law Office, PTPN II gave its Power of Attorney to file a Summation to representatives of Persil IV land owners 2 times, namely May and July 2023. This subpoena asked landowners in Persil IV to immediately vacate the land. According to them, the land is included in HGU No. 94 of 2003. Following the summons, PTPN II, in early August 2023, installed a plank in Persil IV, which stated that the area belonged to PTPN IV. Without waiting for command, all the farmers gathered around the installation of the plank and immediately revoked the plan. Before the subpoena was issued, the Farmer group leaders that owned Persil IV had written to the Deli Serdang Regional Police to hold a Coordination Meeting immediately. This coordination meeting is expected to be a medium that can decide that Persil IV land is outside HGU PTPN II. The National Police is preparing for the Coordination Meeting by conducting a list of invited participants.

The invited parties include Paralegal Kontras, Students, Research Lecturers, Farmers, Land Owners, BPN Deliserdang, the Prosecutor's Office, Muspika, the Village Head, and PTPN II. Until now, Persil IV is still waiting to implement the invitation to the Coordination Meeting. In response to the Subpoena Letter, several mobilizers and owners of Persil IV Land gave a special power of attorney to the North Sumatra Kontra Institute to accompany, defend, and provide legal advice to maintain legal rights to ownership of the land. Furthermore, KontraS North Sumatra gave a Summation Answer. It made copies to several elements of government such as PTPN II, North Sumatra Police Chief, Pangdam I / BB, Governor of North Sumatra, Regent of Deli Serdang, DPRD Deli Serdang, BPN North

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Sumatra and BPN Deli Serdang Office, Head of Subdistrict and Police Chief of STM Hilir, and Head of Tadukan Raga Village and Lau Barus Barus.

General Patterns of Conflict Resolution Results by Local Governments

Conflict resolution by local governments occasionally shows a familiar pattern, although there are variations in handling. The issue of land grabbing carried out by PTPN II, a stateowned enterprise, shows extraordinary strength. During the New Order era, PTPN II was almost mighty in taking force over legal rights ownership. The coercion is linked to the position that PTPN II is part of the Government, which is very strong. With the power at their disposal hiding behind the word State, they can use various means to take over, usually by force and without deliberation. Compensation is given, but only to plants; the soil is not at all. PTPN II argued that the people were only cultivators, even though the Letter of Treats issued in 1953 showed validity, and they also paid taxes on the treated land. Without deliberation, directly cut down trees and plants that are the source of income for residents. This is the second oppression felt by the people first; during colonialism, their land was forcibly taken by the colonials together with the Sultan of Deli. His people carried out the subsequent oppression under the pretext of economic growth and expansion of industrialization of oil palm plantations. The lowest village administration, starting from the village head and subdistrict, did not show any partiality in this case. Moreover, there is a stigma attached, anyone who contradicts the Government will be associated with a banned organization. The road's opening came from the central Government through the Drum Post 5000 channel. From here the starting point of a long struggle for land ownership rights. Struggles carried out legally and nonlegally, such as protests, forced takes, destruction, tactics and strategies involving the parties, such as students, NGOs, Paralegals, and other non-government channels. Landowners often receive harsh and harsh treatment from plantations and even discrimination, with accusations of theft, crossing boundaries, and even accusations of controlling land without permission.

The post-reformation situation gave landowners little flexibility; government elements were more sensitive and careful in responding to complaints or conflicts in the community. This gave Persil IV landowners time to breathe a sigh of relief, to take a moment to use the land they owned. Land utilization by growing sweet potatoes becomes a profitable source of life. Now, they can be calmer and more prosperous in life. They hope that Persil IV's land ownership will soon be legitimized. This legitimacy can provide calm and a source of enthusiasm to work hard to improve his life. They no longer want to feel pain, hardship, and separation from family, like from 1972 to 2004. For now, two meetings are awaited by the Persil IV Farmer Group related to resolving conflicts involving elements of local Government, namely the Coordination Meeting held by the Deli Serdang Police and responses related to Somasi's Answer. The involvement of the Government in resolving land dispute cases between Persil IV Landowners and PTPN II is only a place to submit complaints. Farmer groups convey from the lowest to the highest, from the village head level to the level of the presidential institution of the Republic of Indonesia. All of them only suggest a legal approach or deliberation. This is stated in the response letter of the Assistant

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Vice President of the Republic of Indonesia and the response of the Regent of Deli Serdang in 1997. They are asked to contact PTPN II or through legal channels (district courts). Due to the lack of government involvement, the owners shifted their applications to labor activists, students, LBH, and NGOs. It's just that lately, about maintaining security and reducing the potential for conflicts and clashes between land owners and hired Third Parties or individuals from PTPN II, the sector and social Police have begun to pay attention.

Referring to the Local Government Law No.23 of 2014, in handling conflicts in the regions, local government affairs can include several aspects and actions, including but not limited to mediation and dialogue. Local governments can mediate conflicts between various parties, community groups, organizations, and individuals. Local governments can facilitate dialogue or negotiation to find an acceptable solution for all parties involved. This is the least prominent thing implemented by the local Government, especially the Deli Serdang Regency Government. The Office of the National Land Agency (BPN) of Deli Serdang Regency only follows up if other government agencies request problems. Like cases involving land boundary disputes, when the Police ask for measurements, they do. Local governments are responsible for maintaining security and order in their areas. When cases of conflict involve threats to community security, local governments should take necessary measures to deal with crises. In this case, the Deli Serdang Regency Police is often involved; it's just that in its activities, it is more often in favor of PTPN II. However, lately, the Police have been more cautious and began to be open to responding to the issue of land claims between Persil IV landowners and PTPN II. Local governments can provide accurate and transparent information to communities regarding sources of conflict, impacts, and ways to resolve them. Education is also essential to understand the perspectives and rights of each party. This is rarely done; in fact, everything seems very secretive and full of secrecy. Local governments have a role in law enforcement related to conflicts involving law violations or criminal acts. This can involve cooperation with law enforcement officials, such as the Police and prosecutors. Despite winning the lawsuit at the District Court, High Court to Cassation level of the Supreme Court, the execution was unsuccessful. In fact, in 2004, the Supreme Court granted judicial review. Local governments can undertake community empowerment programs to address the root causes of conflict, such as unequal access to resources or social dissatisfaction. This could include training, educational, and economic programs to reduce tensions. In addition, local governments can issue local regulations that support conflict resolution, such as regulations related to spatial planning, natural resources, and indigenous peoples' rights. Local governments can collaborate with non-governmental organizations, civil society organizations, research institutions, or other institutions with conflict management experience. This kind of cooperation can provide diverse views and more holistic solutions. Local governments must also ensure that all conflict resolution efforts are carried out, respecting human rights and safeguarding the dignity of all parties involved. Local governments must involve all parties involved in the conflict resolution process. Transparency in actions and decisions and community participation can help reduce the potential for further conflict. Local governments should monitor and evaluate programs and

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policies implemented in conflict management to ensure that conflict resolution objectives are achieved.

CONCLUSION

Local governments are responsible for maintaining security and order in their areas. When cases of conflict involve threats to community security, local governments should take necessary measures to deal with crises. In this case, the regional Police are often involved; it's just that their activities more often side with the company's interests. However, lately, the Police have been more cautious and began to be open to responding to the issue of land claims between Persil IV landowners and plantation companies. This study shows a general pattern of conflict resolution results involving the North Sumatra Provincial government only through mediation, facilitation, and court channels. Conflict resolution is carried out without going through an official institutional forum established by the Government so that conflict resolution procedures are not institutionalized and are highly dependent on the skills of local actors in conflict in developing strategies to defend their land. From the absence of a local government forum to solve conflict problems, it was found that youth groups' efforts used their capital to win conflicts with palm oil companies. This research needs to be continued by focusing on how community groups find solutions when conflict resolution is difficult or hampered or how local actors strategize to maintain their land rights and build sustainable economic activities.

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